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THE TWO LAWS IN THOMAS
MORE: A PRELIMINARY
READING OF THE CANON
AND COMMON LAWS IN HIS
CAREER AND WRITINGS'
R. J. SCHOECK*

INTRODUCTION

in the day for most of us to begin with the Nineteenth
Century English jurist's observation that "the state of a man's mind
is as much a fact as the state of his digestion," and in any case we should
want a text a little closer to More's time. In 1477, Chief Justice Brian
said that, "It is common knowledge that the thought of man should not
be tried, for the Devil himself knoweth not the thought of man"-or, in
Law-French, "Comen erudition est l'entent d'un home ne sert trie, car
T IS TOO EARLY

* Attended McGill University (no degree); M.A., Ph.D. Princeton University,
1949. The author, who has been professor of English at St. Michael's College,
University of Toronto (1961-1971), is now Director of Research, Folger Shakespeare Library, Washington, D.C. He is a member of the editorial board of the
American Journal of Jurisprudence, a member of the Columbia Seminar on Legal

History and Political Philosophy, and has served as representative of legal history
on the council of the Renaissance Society of America (1968-1970).
1 A paper given at the St. Thomas More Symposium held at St. John's University
on October 9-10, 1970, under the auspices of the Anglo-American Associates. In
its untruncated form, it will appear with full documentation in the volume of
symposium papers to be edited by the chairman-organizer of the Symposium,
Professor Richard S. Sylvester, and to be published in 1971.
This paper, therefore, appears in the form in which it was presented, and
no effort has been made to alter the touches and tonal emphasis which seemed
appropriate for its oral delivery; nor will there be any footnotes (which of course
were not part of the presentation), save for the one bibliographical note which
follows, and the placing of names in parentheses to identify a number of the
quotations.
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le Diable n'ad conusance de 'entent de
l'home." We shall return, near the end of
my paper, to the question of one's being
triable for thoughts and intentions-so close
to the perilously balanced point on which
More tried to rest his defense: given More's
silence (his argument ran), everyone had
the reasonable right to suppose that by his
silence More was giving assent to the King's
Act of Supremacy. The fact is that the civil
law maxim, Qui tacet consentire videturor, as Harpsfield translates it, he that
holdeth his peace seemeth to consent, cuts
several ways, and much depends upon
where one stands in one's interpretation.
Tout court, we are here to talk about the
interface-a currently fashionable term
which subsumes, as I understand its ambience, both the conflicts and the influences
-between canon and common law as we
find this problem in the career and writings
of Thomas More. We look towards, though
we cannot hope yet to comprehend, the
larger role and importance of law in the
England of More, and ultimately that problem should be related both to the practice
of the day (for which some of the rare
legal books on exhibit must be studied
more closely) and also to such criticisms
of contemporary legal institutions and
practice as those of St. German and
Starkey, and to literary satires like those
of Skelton and John Heywood. And so,
simply to examine the problem with respect to Thomas More; there are two
pivots, two great matters or issues about
which this paper will turn. The first is the
affair of Richard Hunne-because in its
central issue of heresy we have a prime area
of conflict, and it is a case which continued
to be discussed throughout the lifetime of
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More and, indeed, resurfaces again in the
1590's in the controversy of Cosin and
Morice. The second is the matter of More's
trial-in ways and for reasons which will I
think emerge.
THE LEGAL CAREER OF
2
SIR THOMAS MORE

Although he had been admitted to the
bar several years earlier than 1510 and had
served his inn of court, Lincoln's Inn, and
had played a notable role in the 1503
Parliament, Thomas More's first significant
public legal office was that of under-sheriff
of London, which he held from 1510 until
1518. Considering that his mother's father
had been sheriff of London in 1503-1504
and that much of his father's considerable
legal practice had been in the city, Thomas
More's appointment as under-sheriff and

of this paper builds upon several published papers and articles, as well as one as yet unpublished book. I would first cite a survey-article
2 Much

which appeared in 2 CATHOLIC LAW. 61-67
(1956), as an introduction to More, and I would

next list the following in chronological order of
their appearance:
Rhetoric and Law in Sixteenth-Century England, 50 STUDIES IN PHILOLOGY 110-27 (April
1953); Canon Law in England on the Eve of the
Reformation,
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MEDIAEVAL

STUDIES

125-47

(1963); Sir Thomas More, Humanist and Lawyer, 34 TORONTO Q. 1-14 (1964); Recent
Scholarship in the History of Renaissance Law,
20 RENAISSANCE Q. 279-91 (1967); contributions
to the NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (1967);
Court of Arches, Doctor's Commons, LawFrench, Thomas More; Tommaso Moro, 12 BIBLIOTHECA SANCTORUM 608-14 (Rome, 1969).

A series of lectures on Thomas More and the
law

(given

at Yale University

in November-

December 1967) is as yet unpublished. The
lectures were: The Tudor Inns of Court; Thomas
More, Lawyer and Judge; and A Lawyer's Life
of More: Roper's Saint's Life.
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his continuing close relations with the city
and with city companies is more easily understandable.
Plucknett has commented on the extent
to which More would have "ministered
mingled law and equity as Under-Sheriff,"
a point to which to return in developing
the consideration that More had long been
experienced in mingling law and equity
before becoming Lord Chancellor. During
his under-sheriff years, More seems to have
moved into some work with maritime and
international law, both of which drew
heavily upon the procedures of Roman
rather than common law. His most famous
case in this field came in about 1517-his
defense of the papal right to a ship which
Henry had stopped at Southampton and
claimed as a forfeiture. More was retained
as counsel and interpreter for the papal interests, and the case was heard in Star
Chamber before Wolsey and other judges,
where (Roper accounts in his biography),
Sir Thomas More not only declared to
the ambassador the whole effecte of all their
opinions, but also, in defens of the Pope's
side, argued so learnedly himself, that both
was the foresaid forfeyture to the Pope
restored, and himself amonge all the hearers, for his upright and comendable
demeanor therein, so greatly renowmed,
that for no intreaty wold the king from
thenceforth be induced any longer to forbeare his service.
This case of the Pope's ship explains why
More never became a serjeant, for this
event comes on the heels of his having been
away for some months on the 1515 embassy to Bruges (during which he was permitted to fill his office of under-sheriff by
deputy and during which he wrote the

major part of the Utopia); for normally,
having done his two readings at Lincoln's
Inn, he would have soon been made serjeant; and eventually, so distinguished a
common lawyer would have become a
common-law judge. Instead, as we know,
More was drawn into the king's service.
A second point: in this case of the
Pope's ship, as during the trade negotiations at Bruges, More manifested the
results of study and experience in jurisprudential thought of theologians and canonists, and he was skilled in the procedures
of both Roman and canon law. His
admission to Doctor's Commons in 1514
is now more understandable, yet still remarkable, for here is a common lawyer admitted to a professional association of established, if not all distinguished, civilians
without a formal period of study at a university with recognized faculties in the two
laws, and indeed without any academic
degree-much less the advanced degree in
law and the specialized ecclesiastic or
equivalent practice that were required (at
least a little later, if not in 1514). On a
subsequent embassy to Bruges in 15201521, references were made in the confidential Hanseatic dispatches to More's
skillful handling of "multasque rationes,
jura, leges et canones." And other activities
during the 1520's would have developed
still further More's legal expertise in
Roman and canon law-all before he became Chancellor in 1529.
In 1524 he was made high steward of
the University of Oxford, and a year later
of the University of Cambridge as well.
These high stewardships were quasijudicial, for in addition to other duties
More was involved (at one of the unrulier
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periods in the history of those universities)
in trying persons accused of crimes, though
of course, as Chambers goes on to comment, there were also aspects which More
found pleasant. In 1525 More succeeded
Sir Richard Wingfield as Chancellor of the
Duchy of Lancaster, a separate administration of many lands, estates and possessions; here More's offices were partly administrative, but doubtless largely judicial.
The modern More scholar must disagree
with Chambers' statement that "very little
which interests us today is recorded of the
business which came before him in the
Duchy Court," for Margaret Hastings has
been at work on this business for some
years and has shown how potentially rich
the extant records are. In a paper given at
the Anglo-American Conference in 1965
she stressed the freedom of the Chancellor
of the Duchy to operate at a farther remove from "extraneous pressures ... royal
whims and demands . . . and the larger
forces of change in Europe":
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ous evidence of it in the Duchy records.
In Marny's time, 1509-1523, and probably
also in More's, when important decrees
were given, the chief common law justices
of the Duchy were present and party to the
court's decisions.
Duchy were present and party to the
court's decisions. Professor Hastings' conclusion is that More "emerges from the
details of the cases as a hardworking administrator, a peacemaker more concerned
to get at the causes of violence in the
countryside than to inflict harsh punishments, a protector of the weak against the
strong, and an astute lawyer who could
cut through the mass of detail to the heart
of the matter in hand."

She stresses the fact that the procedures of
this court were more flexible than those of
the Chancery, and that since 1485 More's
predecessors had been laymen, generally
trained like More himself in one of the
Inns of Court.

From the earliest days of his legal
practice, More seems to have been known
for his skill in arbitration, for he was involved in some of the most complex estate
questions of his period, to take but one
kind of practice. We shall hear about the
thrust of his literary activities from Professor Martz and about his inner devotional
life from l'Abb6 Marc'hadour-both vital
dimensions in the totality of More-but
let us never forget that More was continuously a busy man of the law, who spent
most of his waking hours for the greatest
portion of his adult life reading petitions
and other legal documents, hearing evidence and questioning witnesses, and
giving opinions or decisions. We can begin
to appreciate the force of his lament that
the law (to borrow Bacon's later phrase)
"drinks too much time"-or as More himself wrote Peter Gilles (another humanistlawyer) in 1516:

if there ever had been a clash between
common law and equity, there is no obvi-

I am constantly engaged in legal business,
either pleading or hearing, either giving an

As Chancellor of the Duchy, he was the
king's lieutenant for the administration of
justice, but, instead of having to administer
it through King's Council, Star Chamber,
Masters of the Requests, and Chancery,
he could perform all his judicial duties
within the one court beginning in his time
to be regularly called the Court of Duchy
Chamber.
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award as arbiter or deciding a case as
judge. I pay a visit of courtesy to one man
and go on business to another. I devote
almost the whole day in public to other
men's affairs and the remainder to my own.
I leave to myself, that is to learning, nothing at all.
When I have returned home, I must talk
with my wife, chat with my children, and
confer with my servants. All this activity
I count as business when it must be doneand it must be unless you want to be a
stranger in your own home ...
At the age of about 52 he was appointed
Lord Chancellor and served from October
1529 to May 1532. He was of course not
the first layman, but there had not been a
layman as chancellor for many years. Even
if we bear in mind Maitland's injunction
that medieval clerics were not all canonists
any more than they were all saints, what
is notable is that for some time the Chancellor had traditionally been the Archbishop of Canterbury or York-Morton,
Warham, Wolsey-and consequently he
was a cleric usually trained in canon law,
probably Roman as well, and hence a person with a training that equipped him to
apply equity in his administration of the
formalized common law.
More's own practice had taken him into
Star Chamber and Chancery proceedings,
and he would long have known that equity
was there applied, and how it was applied.
In 1528 St. German began to develop his
arguments for the greater application of
equity in the common law, in the first
Latin dialogue of what later became his
celebrated Doctor and Student-later expanding the ground of his argument to
differences in procedure between common
and canon law; and by 1533 More would

be deep in controversy with St. German
over conflicts between the two procedures,
notably over the ex officio oath in heresy
matters, as will shortly be seen in discussing the Hunne affair.
Thus, to pinpoint: in 1528 two influential books appeared in England which in
different ways brought to bear upon the
common law concepts of canon and/or
Roman law: Christopher St. German's
Doctor and Student and John Parkins'
Profitable Book, the first published in
Latin, the second in Law-French, and both
with remarkable printing histories. At
about this time a copy of a 1526 Decretum
of Gratian was bought by the son of a
chief justice of Common Pleas and annotated throughout. From these and like
clues, it would appear then that the study
of canon law by common lawyers was
more widespread than has hitherto been
supposed.
RICHARD HUNNE AND
THE STANDISH AFFAIR

The affair of Richard Hunne occupied
Englishmen of all classes for three decades,
and the still-continuing problems of interpreting this complex affair are of prime
concern to historians of Lollardy and of
the growing Lutheranism in Tudor England, to students of the ecclesiastical courts
at the end of the Middle Ages, and to the
future biographer of Thomas More. For
all historians, indeed, it has been a matter
of controversy for the past four centuries.
Here our concern is with locating the
events of this affair in the context of conflicts between common and canon law.
Richard

Hunne

was

a freeman

and
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merchant of London, a well-to-do member of the Merchant Tailors and a citizen
widely known (as More testifies) for his
charitable practices and fair dealing. Overnight his name became a rallying cry for
lay grievances against the clergy, and his
legal causes widened into a conflict between ecclesiastical and secular jurisdiction that foreshadowed the cutting of the
canon-law ties between England and
Rome.
The facts of his story are as follows.
His baby son, an infant of five weeks, died
on March 29, 1511, and the rector of the
parish demanded the child's christening
robe (or binding-sheet) as a mortuary; the
father refused. The rector, Thomas Dryffeld, having waited one year, brought suit
against Hunne for the mortuary on April
26, 1512, suing in the archbishop's court
of Audience. Two days later Hunne was
summoned and on May 13 appeared before the court, where he denied the truth
of Dryffeld's declaration; but Tunstall
pronounced judgment on that date in favor
of the rector. This much we know. What is
not certain is the sequence of all the ensuing court actions, or details of the pleadings in them. It is clear that on December
27, 1512, Hunne was addressed by the
parish priest with these words: "Hunne
thowe arte accursed and thowe stondist
accursed," and that the priest refused to
proceed with vespers until Hunne left the
church. On January 25, 1513, Hunne instituted a suit for slander against the priest,
and a little later in Hilary term his suit
for praemunire was filed. It seems clear
that Hunne had been accused of heresy by
this time, but if so he was not summoned
for a year. On December 2, 1514, he was
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finally brought before the bishop of London on charges of heresy, and two days
later (before any action was taken by the
bishop) he was found hanged in his cell
in the Lollards' Tower; a coroner's jury
was impanelled, but did not return its verdict until February 1515. Meanwhile, on
December 10 a Paul's Cross sermon was
preached against Hunne and on the sixteenth he was signified post mortem; his
corpse was turned over to the secular arm
and burned at Smithfield on December 20,
1514. The child had died in March 1511,
and Hunne himself in December 1514three turbulent years in the courts, and
all men were discussing the case.
Against this background, and that of the
issuance of Leo X's bull in 1514 pronouncing that laymen had no jurisdiction over
churchmen in certain matters (Bulla reformationis curiae), Parliament met in
February 1515, with a sermon by the
Abbot of Winchcombe on the opening of
Convocation that was immediately the
focus of public attention and itself the
cause of a wider cause c6I~bre. For Kidderminster preached against Parliament's
renewal of an act of 1512 (4 Henry VIII,
c.2), the sometimes-called Criminous
Clerks Act, by denying any distinction between major and lesser orders: all orders
were holy orders, he insisted, and therefore
any clerk was immune from the punishment of lay tribunals for criminal offenses.
This was an open challenging of the accepted practice of the common law, and
it was presented as doctrinal and with intransigence.
At the opening of convocation it was
preached that "little by little the laity were
encroaching, serpent-like, upon ecclesi-
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astical dominion" and the bull Supernae
Dispositionis "contained the massive consolaticn of several clauses dealing hard
blows upon the laity." Clerical morale, it
has been argued, must have been strengthened by this bull, and "there is every likelihood that the renewed confidence aroused
by the Fifth Lateran's Council's decree lay
behind the notorious case of Richard
Hunne. . . .Certainly the decree inspired
some strong opinions to be voiced." The
lords, where the spirituality had the
majority vote dropped the statute that
would have renewed the Act of 1512,
although commons had passed a bill to
renew it. At this point, Dr. Henry Standish,
then warden of the mendicant friars in
London and, later to be rewarded with a
bishopric, defended the 1512 Act and
argued that the decree of Leo X had never
been received in England.
On April 17, 1515, the court of aldermen of London appointed a committee to
speak with the bishop of London about
the matter, for in February the coroner's
report on Hunne's death had been shown
to the jury and the jury found that Hunne
had been murdered by the jailor and his
assistant, together with the bishop of
London's chancellor, Dr. Horsley. Feelings
of London citizens ran high indeed. Small
wonder that the historian Polydore Vergil
should have written on March 3, 1515,
that there was a great outcry in England,
and still less wonder that in the popular
mind there should have been a connection
between the particular issue of Horsley as
the accused murderer of Hunne and the
more theoretical issue of criminous clerks
and the debate of Standish and Kidderminster. The two issues are certainly in-

timately connected in the legal memorandum incorporated in Keilwey's Reports.
It is not too much to say that in the debate
that joined these issues not only had a
collision course been set between elements
of the common and the canon law in
England, but a direct challenging of canonlaw jurisdiction had been issued; yet here,
as elsewhere, old socio-religious institutions survive within a new frame of reference.
The 1515 Convocation sermon of
Kidderminster was the focus of the resentments of memb)ers of commons and of
others, and the speaker of the house was
part of a group that requested the king to
have the issue argued further. Accordingly,
the king chose lawyers and theologians to
argue the points involved before various
judges and theological counsel at Blackfriars on March 10, 1515.
There at Blackfriars, Dr. Henry Standish defended the Act of 1512 and asserted
that a papal decree which forbade the conventing of criminous clerks before a temporal judge as peccatum in se had never
been received in England. To the commons' request that the abbot renounce his
opinions publicly at Paul's Cross, the
bishops replied that they would maintain
these opinions with the utmost power. Parliament (and convocation) was prorogued
from April 5 until November, but during
this recess Standish continued to defend
his position in public lectures. And Dr.
Horsley was still in custody, while Standish was at large. But in November
Standish was summoned before convocation and presented with four questions:
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(1) Can a secular court convent clergy
before it?
(2) Are minor orders holy or not?
(3) Does a constitution ordained by
pope and clergy bind a country
whose use is to the contrary?
(4) Can a temporal ruler restrain a
bishop?
The thrust of these questions is all too obvious, and the importance of Standish in
the eyes of contemporary ecclesiastics can
be judged by the note of one who was in
1515 both clerk of the parliaments and
prolocutor of convocation. He wrote in the
record of both assemblies: "in this parliament and convocation there arose the most
dangerous discords between the clergy and
the secular power over the liberties of the
church; and the minister and the fomenter
of all the trouble was a certain friar-minor
of the name of Standish."
Against the questions or charges put to
him in convocation, Standish appealed to
the king for protection. The reply of the
bishops was that they were proceeding
against Standish not for his counsel to the
king (as he was one of the king's spiritual
counsel) but for his public lectures elsewhere. Both the commons and the bishops
exhorted the king's aid in accordance with
his coronation oath, the first to maintain
his temporal authority to the full and the
second to leave Standish to the judgment
of the Church.
A second meeting of judges, the king's
counsel, and some of the commons, took
place at Blackfriars to consider Standish's
answers to the charges of convocation. The
question of the 'reception' of papal decrees
and the dependence of their validity in En-
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gland upon reception there, was one area of
discussion. The judges of the common law
eventually declared that those clergy who
were present at Standish's citation were
guilty of praemunire. With the vague but
terrible threat of praemunire over their
heads, the bishops felt caught on the edge
of the temporal sword. It would seem that
the way of compromise had been worked
out before the next meeting took place at
Baynard's Castle, a royal palace by the
river, adjoining Blackfriar's.
At Baynard's, Wolsey, as Hughes so
aptly remarks (and Reynolds echoes),
"began his career as a cardinal as he was
to end it, kneeling before the king and
begging his mercy from the pains and
penalties of praemunire"; but there is
more of a pattern even than this to Wolsey's career, for in 1529 he would be compelled to admit that he had tried to subject England to a foreign-based canon law.
(It must be observed that the very term
'canon law' changes in the period from
1515 to 1535; but this must be studied
further.) Before a great assembly of both
houses of parliament, of the common law
judges, and of all the king's council,
Wolsey knelt before Henry and made a
partial submission and a partial defense.
The clergy for whom he was spokesman
had no desire to diminish the royal prerogative, he said, but they did feel that
the matter of bringing clerics before lay
judges was contrary to the laws of God
and an infringement of the liberties of the
Church. Wolsey thereupon begged the
king to allow the matter to be determined
by the pope and his counsel at Rome.
Henry's reply was that Standish had already answered all points; and in an
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ensuing general discussion, Foxe and Warham supported Wolsey, and the chiefjustice of the king's bench, Fineux, observed that the clergy could not determine
questions of murder or felony and asked
what point there could be in committing
clergy to courts where they could not be
tried. Henry finally ended the discussion by
declaring that he would maintain the
rights of his crown and temporal jurisdiction as fully as his progenitors had
done; as for the bishops, he observed,
they had always been able to find a way
around canonical obligations whenever it
suited them. When Warham put forth the
plea to delay the decision until the clergy
could place the matter before the Pope for
a solution (at the cost of the clergy),
Henry apparently remained silent, thus
withholding his consent.
Convocation proceeded no further with
its charge of heresy against Standish; a
royal investigation of the murder charge
against Horsley found no real case against
him; and the attorney-general accepted his
plea of 'not guilty' and the case went no
further. But Dr. Horsley had to pay an
enormously heavy fine-and he lost out in
his ecclesiastical career, having to turn to
preferments outside of London. Standish
by contrast, was made a bishop: the name
of the place, St. Asaph, being satirically
turned by some into 'Seynt Asse'.
Compromise had indeed been achieved,
but only a very thin, a perilously thin
covering had been placed over the real
issues and problems. The heavy hand of
Wolsey kept the lid on until 1529, but by
that time Lutheranism would have come
to England and the lid would stay on no
longer. Tyndale and St. German, a cleric

and a layman, a theologian and a common
lawyer, led the campaign for reform, and
both made charges about the Hunne affair
which Thomas More answered in his
writings from 1529 to 1533.
Some further commentary is needed on
the Hunne case. The rector's demanding
a child's christening robe as a mortuary
payment was customary, though it was a
legal right often open to abuse. It may be
that Hunne's argument in refusing lay in
denying that the robe belonged to the
baby, but this argument would surely have
been put forward in earlier, and unsuccessful, tests of mortuary payments; mortuary
disputes in London as C.H. Williams has
noted, were as recent as 1501 and 1502,
and there is no reason to believe that the
citizen there involved did not purge himself as he was ordered to do. It has not
been brought forward in previous discussions of the Hunne case that the child died
in the parish where he had been put to
nurse, the father belonging to another
parish, and that Dryffeld was the rector
of the parish where the child died, not the
parish where the father lived; this may well
have been a new ground of Hunne's refusal to pay a mortuary to Dryffeld, and
this fact may be related to Dryffeld's
having waited a year to bring suit against
Hunne at Lambeth. In any event, Hunne
did appear before Tunstall, who was then
not chancellor of the diocese but chancellor of Archbishop Warham and auditor
of causes. The issue was found for Dryffeld by Tunstall, but there is no indication that Hunne paid or intended to pay;
however, excommunication would have
been indicated as consequent upon a failure or refusal to pay, it must be observed.
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It is strange, then, to learn that although
this case was over by May 1512, Hunne
was apparently not accursed by the parish
priest before December 27, 1512-well
beyond the traditional forty days but there
is in fact no record of his having been excommunicated at this stage of proceedings.
The usual assumption here is that the
parish priest's denunciation (in December
1512) followed merely upon Hunne's
failure to make the mortuary payment as
he had been ordered by the bishop in the
preceding May. It is possible, but not
likely, that Hunne had begun process for
a suit of praemunire before December
(and that this would have been the cause
of his denunciation); but we cannot be
sure. We know only that the praemunire is
recorded in Hilary term, 1513, and is preceded by an action for slander, sued out
on January 25, 1513.
Thomas More thought that Hunne "was
detected of heresye before the praemunire
sued or thought upon," as he wrote in the
Supplicacion of Soules, and then the parish
priest's denunciation in December 1512
would have been for heresy, not for refusal
to pay a mortuary. This explanation would
clarify the sequence, but if the denunciation were for heresy, the long delay before
his being summoned becomes an element
that needs explanation. Yet, it may well be
that the heresy process was simply set aside
until the praemunire issue was settled. The
inference from the available evidence is
that Hunne's demurrer in the praemunire
suit had been argued in the Michaelmas
term of 1512 and effectively decided
against Hunne, and that a formal judgment
would have been entered in Hilary term
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1513, but that Hunne was by that time
dead.
In the winter of 1512-1513, the scope
and power of praemunire had not yet been
fully determined, but the penalties were
severe: complete loss of lands and goods,
at least. In his praemunire suit, Hunne
named Dryffeld as the principal defendant.
The defendant's plea was that the whole
process was lawful. To this Hunne demurred.
Several possible pleas would have been
open to Hunne-besides the two already
noted, that mortuaries as property ought
not to fall within the jurisdiction of a
spiritual court, or that the whole ecclesiastical system was a foreign system of lawbut we do not know, the proceedings
having been lost. More tells us that the
decision which would have been given
would have gone against Hunne, that
it appered clerely to the temporall judge
and all that were anye thinge learned in
the temporall lawe, that hys suite of ye
praemunire was nothing worth in ye kinges
law, for asmuch as by plaine statute the
ple to the holden upon mortuaries, belongs
unto the spirituall court.
The inference to be drawn from More's
comment is that the jurisdiction of the
spiritual court was clearly recognized by
all, and that there had not been-at least,
not recently-any challenges of that jurisdiction. However, the statute or writ Circumspecte Agatis (13 Ed. 1, 1285)while it limited ecclesiastical courts to
what was then interpreted as strictly ecclesiastical business-could be seen as
carrying royal assent to that business.
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Denounced by the parish priest on 27
December 1512, and claiming damage in
reputation and business, Hunne also instituted suit for slander. What is remarkable is that his fellow-merchants seem to
have reacted already (in response to some
ecclesiastical pressure), and one must ask
whether Hunne was in fact vitandus by the
end of 1513.
While much has been made of More's
friendship with Tunstall, not enough stress
has been put on More's close connections
with the city and its companies, which
would have been as likely to give him a
bias towards London merchants as towards
the hierarchy; for in addition to his quasijudicial office as one of the two undersheriffs of London from 1510 to 1518, he
acted for or with a number of the London
companies on legal and business matters,
and was especially intimately involved
with the Merchant Adventurers, and from
1510 to 1512 he represented the City in
Parliament. But there is one further connection, seldom noted: More was brotherin-law of the lawyer-printer John Rastell,
who was soon after given wardship of
Hunne's two daughters.
While at first reading More does not
seem concerned with questions of the conflict of jurisdiction in the Hunne case, we
must consider the context of the oft-cited
chapter in the Dialogue: first, that it belongs to the year 1528-1529, a period of
vigorous anti-clericalism, but not yet of a
splitting off from Rome; and second, that
it is part of a literary dialogue and that in
this chapter More is dealing only with what
the Messenger knows by hearsay about the
Hunne affair-consequently More chooses

to discuss the case only in this light, and
his treatment is rather humorous, both to
discredit the rumours and to induce the
reader to see the case in a chosen perspective. Shortly afterwards, the case again appears in a controversial work, The Supplication of Souls, in which More is
answering similar charges made in Simon
Fish's Supplication of Beggars, a violently
anti-clerical work. (A year or two later,
the common lawyer Christopher St. German will attack More from another quarter, but that must be a later chapter in this
complex story.) For now, we must simply
declare that in the Dialogue and the Supplication More is answering allegations and
rumours about the handling of the charges
of heresy against Richard Hunne-no
more. However, we do learn that bitterness
in London about the case continues nearly
twenty years later, and we can test More's
essential accuracy in his handling of facts,
even though he does not present the full
story.
More tells us in the Dialogue that he
knew the case intimately:
So well I knowe it from toppe to toe that
I suppose there be not very many menne
that knoweth it much better. For I have not
only been divers tymes present myself at
certain examinacions thereof, but have
also dyvers and manye times sunderley
talked with almost all such, except the
dead man hymselfe, as most knew of the
matter.
I do not know how to explain the contradiction with a passage later in the
Apology which very strongly implies that
More had talked with Hunne:
And yet for bycause I perceyued in him a
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great vayne gloryouse lykynge of hym
selfe, and a great spyce of the same spyryt
of pryde that I perceyued byfore in Rycharde Hunne when I talked with him ....
Apology (Taft ed. at 142)

logical counsellors on the progress of the
Standish matter and that his decision was
final and, for the future of church-state
relations in England, absolutely determinative.

If the phrase "when I talked with him" is
to refer only to Thomas Philippis and not
to Hunne, then this is a very careless sentence on a crucial point. More thought,
from his knowledge of the case, that
Horsley was not guilty. He was also convinced that Hunne had been a heretic, and
in the Dialogue he brings forward the
evidence of an Essex carpenter accused of
heresy six or seven years after Hunne's
hanging, who named Richard Hunne as
one of those who came together secretly
for heretical readings. But the strongest
argument by More is that,

Thus the king's assertion of his view of
sovereignty and jurisdiction is to be studied
with care:

My self was present in Poules when the
bishop, in the presence of the Mayre and
the aldermen of the citie, condemned him
for an heretic after his death. And than
were there read openly the depositions by
which it was wel proved that he was convicte as well of diuers other heresies, as of
misbelief toward the holy sacrament of the
aulter. And thereupon was the judgment
given that his body should be burned, and
so was it. Now thys is (quod 1) to me a
full profe.
When we turn from the Hunne affair to
the Standish, the evidence is less contradictory; the issues are clearly drawn, and
perhaps the clearest is the opposition of
Standish and Kidderminster, the direct
challenging by Kidderminster of the common law position and the direct challenging by Standish of the traditional liberties
of the church. Further, it is clear that the
King consulted carefully with his theo-

By the ordinance and sufferance of God
we are King of England, and the Kings of
England in time past have never had any
superior but God alone. Wherefor know
you well that we will maintain the right of
our Crown and of our temporal jurisdiction, as well in this point as in all others,
in as ample a wise as any of our progenitors have done before us. And as to
your decrees, we are well informed that
you yourselves of the Spiritualty do expressly contrary to the words of many of
them, as has been well shown to you by
some of our spiritual Counsel; nevertheless, you interpret your decrees at your
pleasure. Wherefor, consent to your desire
more than our progenitors have done in
time past we will not.
For the influence of this affair upon
More's career and thought, a few words.
First, it is difficult to believe that it would
not have coloured his thinking during the
months he was away from England immediately after the meeting of Parliament
in February 1515 and while he was writing
the first draft of his Utopia during his
Flemish embassy. This collision of the
spiritual and the temporal laws, together
with the failure of the Fifth Lateran Council to achieve reform, surely go far (as I
think) to explain the note of urgency in
Book I of the Utopia. And while there is
little in More's writings that is a direct
commentary on the criminous clerks ques-

THE

Two

LAWS IN THOMAS MORE

tion, it is worth recalling that in his Utopia
those priests who commit any offense
whatsoever suffered no temporal punishment; instead, they were left only to God
and their own consciences:
•.. even if they have committed any crime,
they are subjected to no tribunal but left
only to God and to themselves. They judge
it wrong to lay human hands upon one,
however guilty, who has been consecrated
to God in a singular manner as a holy
offering. It is easier for them to observe
this custom because their priests are very
few and very carefully chosen.
Second, as I have commented elsewhere,
we must realize that More was officially
concerned with heretics before he became
Chancellor of England, before he became
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster,
before, even, he wrote the Utopia in 1515.
The implications of this point are several,
and I am sure they will be discussed.
The above passages from Thomas
More's writings dealing with the Hunne
affair have been torn from their contexts
in very different works, and, therefore,
something must be said about their weight
and usefulness. One must here also stress
the obvious: More's cited writings are all
in the vernacular, whereas heretofore the
canon law was of course a matter for
Latin. Christopher St. German's writings
are notable for pioneering discussion of
equity, procedure and other matters in
English. Inevitably there would be problems of terminology (one must note problems in citations, e.g., and the carrying
over into English of Latin tags familiar
enough to those trained in canon law in
Latin), but other difficulties as well. These
I must defer for later treatment.

At no time did More sit down to write
out a full brief on the Hunne affair; in his
Supplication of Soules, first, he is answering Simon Fish's satiric and often deliberately exaggerated attack in A Supplication for the Beggars (1528); in his
Dialogue (1529), he is dealing with the
Lutheran case, but the mood, the control,
the pace, are such that one can read with

good humour-and in Book III, chapter
15, More's fullest treatment of the Hunne
affair, he persuades the Messenger in the
dialogue that the popular notions are misconceptions. The remaining works which
refer to Hunne are in one respect at least
of a kind. The Confutation (part I, 1532;
part II, 1533), the Apology and Debellation (both 1533) are replies (the first to
Tyndale, the second and third to Chris-

topher St. German, though he wrote
anonymously and More did not identify
his anonymous opponent with the author
of Doctor and Student). They have a
common method and a common tone
which is not-good-humoured.
The greater part of the Debellation is
devoted to More's defense of the existing
laws for the investigation and trial and
punishment of heretics. More in his conclusion (Works at 1031/ sig. T.viii/)
almost misses St. German's main thrust.
For More lays the consent of the general
council and "the generall approbacion of
all christen realmes" against the changes
which St. German proposes; but that is
precisely what St. German denies, for he is
doing nothing less than challenging the

traditional system of canon law, with its
authority,

procedures

and

jurisdiction.

More argues against this "generall approbacion"; he layeth his own reason. And

16
what is his own "irrefragable resen"? The
Hunne case is therefore presented with a
need and greater urgency by St. German.
To Fish, it had been an example of what
results from a court-system whose procedure is secret; but he scarcely challenges
that system as a whole. St. German is
challenging the system, and he uses the
Hunne affair as an example; his division
of spirituality and temporalty is deliberately a dividing, with a lessening and subordinating of the spirituality. (But the
debate of More and St. German on canon
v. common law must be deferred.)
As to More's view of the conflict between common law and canon law that
emerges during the Hunne affair and the
sequential Standish case, at this stage of
More studies I can only assert my opinion
that More did not accept the dominant
view of Parliament, of commons (which
perhaps represented the view of a majority of English common lawyers-though
this is by no means certain) that Parliament could solve disputed points of canon
law. Rather, as Dorrett has pointed out,
he shared the continental view that Parliament could not. But much further study
of More's legal writings and of his legal
philosophy needs to be done.
To generalize only from this one case
would be to act like the tourist who exclaimed, "all Indians walk in single file.
At least the one I saw did."
Yet this one case, with its wealth of
secondary materials, points clearly towards
a wider body of events, evidence and
literature, and towards several conclusions.
First, no one can deny that there was
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current a general dissatisfaction with the
machinery of the courts Christian; "popular feeling, in London at any rate," a distinguished Tudor historian has written,
"had been inflamed by quarrels between
the laity and the ecclesiastical courts over
church-dues and jurisdiction," and there
was much bitterness towards the secrecy of
the ecclesiastical courts. The dry wood
needed only a strong spark to burst into
flame. The coroner's jury and its findings,
together with the popular outcry over
Hunne's death and against Dr. Horsley,
point to what our generation can call only
a credibility gap. And, we must observe
further, there seems to be very little evidence that the Fifth Lateran Council,
then sitting, was very much concerned, or
sufficiently concerned, with these matters
which so deeply troubled the laity; clearly,
there was no effort to communicate what
few efforts had been made towards reform
to the laity. In England the effulgent figure
of Wolsey, as Pollard graphically writes,
"had been invoked to pale the ineffectual
fires of an insurgent house of commons,"
after these fire-warnings had been continuously ignored by Rome. This early in
the history of the Reformation, it is
notable that Richard Hunne was a merchant; not that heresy or even strong anticlericalism was a characteristic peculiar to
his class, but that Hunne as a merchant enjoyed a high degree of independence and
a high social status, whereas the city's
parish clergy tended to be of a much lower
social position. We can say with firmness
that when the stand was taken against what
so many of the London citizenry had long
thought were the unreasonable demands of
the clergy, particularly in areas of mortu-
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ary payments and ecclesiastical procedure,
it is no surprise that such a stand was made
by a merchant.
Cooperation there was and had been
between secular and ecclesiastical jurisdictions, but it turned on a perilous balance.
While one would not use so anachronistic
a concept as the consent of the governed
here, nonetheless it would appear that in
England the close cooperation of which
Logan speaks in his study of excommunication was possible, and would continue,
only so long as the secular power so consented. Once challenged seriously, and with
the tacit support of the king, the force of
the ecclesiastical arm fell to the ground.
Further, it follows-if my reading of the
Hunne case is accurate-that the Reformation in England began in 1515 but was
interrupted. Checked by a number of forces
-and not least by the enormous and thenincreasing concentration of power in the
hands of Wolsey (so much of it illegal,
i.e., contrary to or without the sanction of
existing canon law) -the Reformation was
held back until 1529. Then, at the time of
Wolsey's fall (though not primarily for that
reason), the forces for reform began to
swell, and there is merit in echoing the
clich6 that the 1529 Parliament, the socalled Reform Parliament, began where the
1515 and 1523 Parliaments had left off.
These observations and conclusions have
an important bearing for the history of the
Reformation in England; but, for the moment, I would urge that the Hunne affair
is vital for understanding the relations between ecclesiastical and secular jurisdictions in England: and that, from a reading
of the case as has here been put forward,

one would have to conclude for England at
least that the long-overdue reform of the
canon law (which had been on the agenda
of the Fifth Lateran Council) was in fact
too late to prevent the gathering storm,
even if it had been successfully dealt with
before the close of that council in April
1517, for the split had been manifestly
widening in 1515, and October 1517 was
already too late.

THE TRIAL OF SIR THOMAS MORE

There is no need to recapitulate the story
of More's trial-already well told by Chambers, it has more recently been twice told
by Reynolds, and there is of course the
version by Bolt in A Man for All Seasons,
which has already influenced the way that
our students picture and think of the trial.
Yet some aspects deserve commentary in
the light of our present discussion.
Long imprisoned in the Tower; yet the
length of that imprisonment, while it grabs
our hearts with fear and pity, the length is
not so extraordinary as the quality of the
solitary life More lived, as we know from
the evidence of the Prayer Book and from
the Tower writings. The final events in
More's case moved swiftly, after the trial
of John Fisher on June 17, 1535, and his
beheading on the June 22. A grand jury at
Westminster returned a true bill against
More, described as "late of Chelsea," on
June 28, and the trial was set for July 1.
Crucial to the concluding part of the indictment is the charge of the jurors that
"the aforesaid Thomas More, falsely, traitorously, and maliciously" deprived the
king of the dignity, title, and name of the
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Supreme Head on earth of the Church of
England.
More's first reply stressed the fact that
he was being tried under acts passed while
he was imprisoned, and that during this
time of imprisonment he had kept silent
on all matters pertaining to the State.
Touching, I say, this challenge and accusation, I aunswere that, for this my
taciturnitic and silence, neyther your lawe
nor any lawe in this world is able iustly
and rightly to punishe me, vnlesse you may
besydes laye to my charge eyther some
worde or some facte in deede.
(Harpsfield at 185)
It is at this point that More argued that
if the rule and Maxime of the ciuill lawe
be good, allowable and sufficient, that Qui
tacet, consentire (he that holdeth his peace
seemeth to consent), this my silence implyeth and importeth rather a ratification
and confirmation then any condemnation
of your Statute.
(Harpsfield at 185-86)
More, it is clear, rested his case upon this
subtle principle, supported as it was by civil
law tradition-but he was speaking to men
trained in the common law, not civilians or
even canonists. It was a delicate principle,
and the tactics of arguing upon it to such
a body of judges must be seen as a desperate remedy. Professor Elton has recently
reminded us of how relatively undeveloped
the law of treason was on the eve of the
Henrician Reformation, and so it was.
Mere treasonable utterances had already
been construed by fifteenth-century common-law judges as constituting an overt
deed within the meaning of the statute of
25 Edw. II, st. 5, c.2 (1352): words, it
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is clear, "were quite often treated as equivalent to overt deeds in trials of treason."
It is then, perhaps not so remarkable that
the woolier minds among the Tudor common lawyers could with some force of
sincerity have believed that the withholding
of consent, particularly by the king's former
lord chancellor, be construed as treasonable. Greatness or high place gave no security against the suspicion of treason, as
we know from the histories of the Buckinghams, Poles, Wyatts and others during
the reign of Henry VIII.
Then there is the quite different matter
of Rich's testimony. It does More no good
now, as it would have done him no good
then, to point out that generally in ecclesiastical matters involving good faith, contracts, and the like, two witnesses would
have been required; certainly, in heresy
proceedings, it would be most unusual to
find fewer than two witnesses to establish
the guilt of the accused. Heresy was a kind
of treason of the soul; there are parallels,
and we should not be surprised by an
awareness of such parallels. But on this
point, at least, the courts christian would
have given a witness somewhat more safeguards than did the court that tried More.
Roper quotes two of More's speeches in
some detail, and they are so vital that they
must be quoted again here. While speaking
to the discharge of his own conscience and
to the demurrer that the particular law
under which he was being charged was
contrary to the laws and statutes of England, he cites Magna Charta:
Quod Anglicana ecclesia libera sit, et habeat omnia Jira sua integra et libertates
suas illoesas.
(Roper at 93)
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Speaking thus against the intrusion of the
authority of the State into a field reserved,
as he argued, to the Church, More was interrupted by the chancellor, Audley, who
asked More if he set his judgment against
that of so many learned men, the bishops
and the universities. More replied:
If the number of Bishoppes and vniuersytyes be so material! as your lordeshippe
seemethe to take it, Then se I litle cause,
my lorde, why that thing in my consciens
should make any chainge. For I nothinge
doubte but that, thoughe not in this realme,
yeat in Christendome aboute, of thes well
lerned I Bishoppes and vertuous men that
are yeat alive, they be not the fewer parte
that be of my mind therein. But if I should
speake of those whiche already be dead, of
whom many be nowe holy sainctes in
heaven, I am very sure it is the farre*
greater parte of them that, all the while
[they] lived, thoughte in this case that waye
that I thinck nowe. And therefore am I
not bounde, my lord, to conforme my
consciens to the Councell of one Realme
against the generall Councell of Christendome.
The thrust of More's conciliar thought surfaces here: his argument and appeal are
anchored upon a General Council of Christendom, not upon a Pope, and least upon
the single historic figure who was then sitting in the chair of Peter. Although it may
be said that this is a theological, or ecclesiological point, I would insist that it does
have very deep implications for More's
legal thought. His notion of the universal
competence and jurisdiction of the canon
law of the church of Christendom is involved, and he would not subordinate that
law to the law of one realm.
One final point, and as Roper contains

the entire matter within a single paragraph,
I shall read him entire:
Nowe when Sir Thomas More, was thavoydinge of the Indictment, had taken as
many exceptions as he thought meete, and
[many] moe reasons then I can nowe remember alleaged, The Lord Chauncelour,
loth to haue the burthen of the Iudgmente
wholye to depend vppon himself, there
openlye asked thadvise of the Lord Fitz
James, then Lord Chief Justice of the kings
Bench, and ioyned in Comission with
him, whether this indictment were sufficient
or not. Who, like a wise man, awneswered:
"My lords all, By St Julian" (that was euer
his oath), "I must needes confes that if
thacte of parliament be not vnlawfull, then
is not the Indictment in my conscience insufficient."
It was indeed, to echo Reynolds on this
point, rather late in the day to question the
sufficiency of the indictment, and Fitzjames's answer is most guarded: if the Act
of Parliament was lawful, then is the indictment sufficient. But if it were not, Fitzjames's guarded reply (couched in the
negative) does not dare to go that far. Yet
that, surely, is the point.
CONCLUSION

That Thomas More lived in a complex
age is a truism. Indeed, one might well
quip that all ages are complex (to those
that live in them), only some are more
complex than others. Yet Tudor historians
and all scholars dealing with the literature
and thought and institutions of the period
would substantially agree that there were
profound transformations taking place
within the lifetime of Thomas More, and
not least within the legal institutions, concepts, and the very language of the law.
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But More himself did not question-ever,
anywhere, so far as I know-the organic
notion of the two arms of the law, the
secular (or civil) and the ecclesiastical;
for only the first of which he was responsible (as lord chancellor), and the second
of which (as a layman) he did not control,
yet in which he played a significant, if as
yet undetermined, role.
It seems unmistakably clear to me that
More was a legal amphibian, who could
move and did work within the two systems
and within their interface-and, still further, that he believed in the possibility, indeed the necessity, of the two systems
working together. A dissenter may ask,
didn't everyone? I should have to answer
quite firmly, no! There were many who
fought the power or the abuses of the ecclesiastical system, like Roy and Tyndale and
a number of others-and perhaps those
who complained against the language, or
power, or mysticism of the common law
provide a needed parallel-but there was
at least one who wrote, and this we know
for certain, powerfully and persuasively
against the ecclesiastical system in toto,
Christopher St. German. Thomas More
was not writing against straw men; there
was a challenge, and from 1529 to 1534 he
tried to meet that challenge. After .1532,
May 15 to be precise, with the Submission
of Clergy he must have known that he had
failed, that the fight was lost. Why then
continue the fight? There was first the
effort to defend the Church or the hierarch,
or even more importantly what More conceived as Christendom against charges
which he thought inaccurate or unjust, and
progressively malicious. There was secondly the hope of changing the minds, or
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modifying the views, of the many who
would otherwise be won straight over by
advocates of the New Lutheran Learning.
But I think as much as all else there was
that in More which could not abide a false
case or position and have it win by default;
simply, he had to answer St. German.
To a lawyer like More, the matter of
jurisdiction which was so much the heart
of the Hunne affair was a vital matter, and
it connected intimately with his own case.
After the verdict had been delivered in his
own trial-and only then-More gave
forth his mind in one last great speech, as
we all know, declaring that he had all the
councils of Christendom and not just the
council of one realm (and councils of the
past, not just the minds of the present) to
support him in the decision of his conscience. (And may I interject that I have
elsewhere offered a reading of Roper's Life
of More as a Tudor saint's life about a man
with a superlatively developed conscience?)
If the Hunne affair turned upon the jurisdiction of two courts over a mortuary garment and the attendant causes between a
layman and his parish priest, his bishop,
and all that, More's trial turned on the
Erastian question of state dominion or
jurisdiction over the Church and his conscience. More died, not so much for any
one historic Pope-friend of Erasmus and
of so many diplomats with Roman experience that he was, he could have had no
illusions about Julius or Leo or Clement
VII, their dilatory successory who helped
the Reformation to come to a boil in England through his calculated strategy of
doing nothing over Henry's divorce proceedings-or even for an isolated, general
notion of the papacy. More's death, as Pro-
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fessor Sylvester has recently written, "resulted directly from his belief that no lay
ruler could have jurisdiction over the
Church of Christ," and his concept of the
Church was more compatible with a postVatican II concept than with a Tridentine.
Born into a lawyer's family, trained in
the household of an ecclesiastic who was
both archbishop of Canterbury and Lord
Chancellor of England, schooled in the
common law to which he devoted so much
of his mature life and skilled in much of
the lore and technique of the civil and

canon laws as well, More died as he had
lived: a lawyer who accepted and practiced
within the structure of a double legal system that until the eve of the Reformation
had functioned with its delicate balances,
an implicitly organic structure of two arms
of the law, of two great court systems
which if they did not reinforce or complement each other had at least demonstrated
that they could coexist-less than perfectly,
of course, but with some considerable efficiency and with no little justice-and he
could not accept a subordinating of the one
system to the other.

